A(1).Petition/Certificates: Timeliness
In re Linda W., 349 Ill. App. 3d 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). State's first petition seeking a finding that a patient was a person subject to involuntary commitment was dismissed. Immediately a second petition was filed but the first of two certificates in support of the second petition was not filed until one hour and 20 minutes after the patient was served with the second petition. The patient's detention during the one hour and 20 minute time frame was unlawful and the circuit court's commitment order was erroneous. 405 ILCS 5/3-602, “The petition shall be accompanied by a certificate.”
In In re Helen S., 342 Ill. App. 3d 330, 795 N.E.2d 298, 276 Ill. Dec.945 (5th Dist. 2003). Three separate petitions dismissed as untimely. To calculate timeliness of State's petition to involuntarily admit patient to facility under statute requiring petition to be filed within 24 hours of patient's admission to facility, correct date is the date the patient was initially confined in hospital, rather than date trial court approved temporary detention of patient under different statute. Petition was untimely when filed within 24 hours of temporary detention order but more than a week after patient's initial admission. Patient was never discharged, but rather remained admitted through date the petition was filed. Requires dismissal of petition.
In re Nancy A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 355, 795 N.E.2d 377, 277 Ill. Dec. 10 (5th Dist. 2003). Dismissal without prejudice of untimely petition to involuntarily admit respondent to mental health facility did not restart 24-hour period for State to file and serve another petition after patient was admitted to facility. The second petition filed within 24 hours of dismissal of first petition was also untimely, where respondent was not discharged, and did not remain voluntarily after first petition was dismissed. The original admission date applied to the second petition, making it untimely.
Doe v. Channon, 335 Ill. App. 3d 709, 781 N.E.2d 517, 269 Ill. Dec 720 (1st Dist. 2002). The overnight detention of the patient was lawful as the 24-hour detention period provided for pursuant to the first certificate issued had not yet expired. The plaintiff was admitted on a Friday, examined by a psychiatrist on Saturday, but not released until Sunday. Section 3-610 states that a psychiatrist must examine the respondent no later than 24 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after he is admitted. 405 ILCS 5/3-610
In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Where a petition was drafted but not filed prior to an ex parte hearing for detention and further psychiatric evaluations there was no violation of 405 ILCS 5/3-611. The subsequent written petition was filed within 24 hours of the respondent’s admission in accordance with sections 3-611 and 3-701 of the code.
In
re Demir,
322 Ill. App. 3d 989, 751 N.E.2d 616, 256 Ill. Dec. 226 (4th Dist.
2001). Using de novo review, and ruling that "the failure to timely
file the petition is an error that cannot be waived … or considered
harmless," the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for
involuntary admission because the petition had not been filed within 24 hours
of the respondent's admission.
In re Moore, 301
Ill.
App. 3d 759, 704 N.E.2d 442, 235 Ill.
Dec. 93 (4th Dist. 1999).
Appealing the order for his
involuntary admission, the respondent argued that, in violation of
Section 3-610, he had not been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of
his admission. The Court reviewed this
question of law de novo. The Court found
that, for purposes of 3-610, “admission” refers only to the respondent’s
presence on a hospital’s psychiatric unit, not to his presence at the emergency
room or other areas of the hospital.
Because the respondent had been examined by a psychiatrist within
24 hours of his presence on the hospital’s psychiatric unit, there was no violation of Section 3-610.
In re Ellis, 284
Ill.
App. 3d 691, 672 N.E.2d 893, 220 Ill.
Dec. 76 (3rd Dist. 1996). In
violation of Section 3-610, the State failed to show that the respondent had
been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission. And, in violation of Section 3-601, the State
failed to list the names of the respondent’s family on the petition. Thus, the trial court’s order for involuntary
admission was reversed. (LAS)
In re Rovelstad,
281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 667 N.E.2d
720, 217 Ill. Dec. 631 (2nd
Dist. 1996). The respondent appealed the
order for admission, alleging that he had not been personally examined by a
psychiatrist within 24 hours of his admission and that no second certificate
had ever been filed with court. Refusing
to engage in speculation, the Appellate Court ruled that the State had not
shown that the required examination had occurred and, in any event, the record
was clear that no second certificate had been filed. Relying on the plain error rule, and finding the State's violation of the Code "inexcusable,"
the Court reversed the trial court's order.
In re Tiffin,
269 I11. App. 3d 285, 646 N.E.2d 285, 206 Ill.
Dec. 918 (4th Dist. 1995). Error to allow reinstatement of original petition,
voluntarily dismissed with leave to reinstate upon respondent's request for
voluntary admission, when respondent ultimately requested discharge. 735 ILCS
5/2-1009(a) is inconsistent with 405 ILCS 5/3-403 & 3-b02; allowing
reinstatement would result in stale certificates being filed with petition
contrary to Code requirements.
In re Luttrell, 261
Ill. App. 3d 221, 633 N.E.2d 74, 198 Ill.
Dec. 612 (4th Dist. 1994). Reviewing
court would not engage in "string of unsupported speculations" to
reach conclusion that petition for continued involuntary admission was timely
filed where timeliness could not be determined by review of record.
In re Connors, 255
Ill.
App. 3d 781, 627 N.E.2d 1171, 194 Ill.
Dec. 529 (4th Dist. 1994). Res judicata prohibited filing of 3-600 emergency
petition on same day that trial court earlier discharged respondent, having
found proof insufficient in initial 3-700 proceeding. Although individual
petitioners were different, the State was party to both proceedings; fact that
petitions were brought pursuant to different Code sections was insignificant,
as both involved involuntary admission; different evidence presented at second
hearing could have been presented at first hearing and some change of
circumstance is necessary.
In re Stone, 249
Ill.
App. 3d 861, 619 N.E.2d 1345, 189 Ill.
Dec. 296 (2d Dist. 1993). Section 3-611 of the Code does not include a
"business hours" exception. "If a person is admitted on a
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the 24-hour period in which the petition must be
filed begins at midnight of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or
holiday, and it expires at midnight the following day...the 24-hour period
should be said to begin at 12:01 a.m. of the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday or holiday, and expires at 12:01 a.m. the following day. "
In re LaTouche, 247
Ill. App. 3d 751, 617 N.E.2d 882,
187 Ill. Dec. 387 (2d Dist.
1993). The untimely filing of the
petition, in violation of Section 3-611, was neither waived nor harmless and
required reversal of the trial court's order for admission.
In re Nau, 153
Ill.
2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134, 180 Ill.
Dec. 240 (1992). Untimeliness of filing of petition for recommitment (filed one
day after expiration of original commitment order) was waived where not raised
in trial court and delay resulted in no prejudice.
In re Long, 233
Ill.
App. 3d 334, 599 N.E.2d 90, 174 Ill.
Dec. 544 (2d Dist. 1992). Petition filed
after expiration of initial commitment period would be considered a new
petition for emergency admission under 3-600, inasmuch as respondent was
"discharged" and despite respondent's allegation that she was never
actually released. "Discharge" distinguishes this case from Hatala,
Walker, Bloyer, and Vancil. Read, Shaw, and Clarke
relied upon.
In re Houlihan, 231
Ill. App. 3d 677, 596 N.E.2d 189,
172 Ill. Dec. 910 (2d Dist.
1992). First petition naming voluntary respondent who had requested release was
dismissed for lack of timeliness, and the respondent was discharged; second
petition filed immediately in open court. Argument that second petition was
untimely per 3-403 rejected; petition was proper under 3-701. Shaw
followed, Guthrie rejected. Court noted that in this case, unlike either
of those cases, respondent was "discharged."
People v. Read, 822 Ill. App. 3d 664, 592 N.E.2d 1178, 170 Ill. Dec. 498 (5th Dist. 1992). Actual physical release of respondent pursuant to court's
dismissal of petition did not prohibit State from filing subsequent petition,
as actual physical release is not necessary to definition of
"discharge" and record fails to demonstrate that respondent sought to
leave, or was prevented from leaving, facility between dismissal of first
petition and filing of second petition.
In re Clark, 220
Ill.
App. 3d 1024, 581 N.E.2d 408, 163 Ill.
Dec. 457 (4th Dist. 1991). Failure to have second certificate did not justify
release of respondent where third petition, filed day before hearing, included
two certificates, and was basis of hearing after dismissal of second
insufficiently supported petition, and despite insufficient notice. Note that
Clarke was under investigation for solicitation of murder, had made threats,
and had earlier been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The Appellate Court
was "singularly unimpressed" with the efforts of DMHDD and the
State's Attorney to comply with the Code.
In re Valentine,
201 Ill. App. 3d 10, 558 N.E.2d
807, 146 Ill. Dec. 844 (5th Dist.
1990). Failure to comply with 3-610 requirement of psychiatric examination
within twenty-four hours of admission deprives trial court of jurisdiction and
renders judgment erroneous and of no effect. Respondent should have been
released on counsel's motion. Wheeler distinguished.
In re Hatala, 200
Ill.
App. 3d 163, 558 N.E.2d 694, 146 Ill.
Dec. 731 (2d Dist. 1990); In re Walker, 200 Ill.
App. 3d 159, 558 N.E.2d 691, 146 Ill.
Dec. 728 (2d Dist. 1990). Failure to file petition for re-commitment before
expiration of prior order deprives trial court of jurisdiction. Any part of
first day of prior order counted as full day in computing duration of order.
In re Franklin, 186
Ill. App. 3d 245, 541 N.E.2d 168,
133 Ill. Dec. 331 (4th Dist.
1989). In proceedings for continued commitment, Art. VII applies and requires
that respondent be given notice 36 hours prior to the court-ordered examination
required by 3-702; 3-704 requires that the examination be performed within 24
hours after "detention" and the detention date is the date the
petition for continued hospitalization is filed. Respondent must be served with
a copy of the petition, order for examination and statement of rights
In re Vancil, 183
Ill.
App. 3d 204, 538 N.E.2d 1372, 131 Ill.
Dec. 816 (3d Dist. 1989); In re Bloyer, 185 Ill.
App. 3d 245, 541 N.E.2d 224, 133 Ill.
Dec. 387 (2d Dist. 1989). Untimely petition, in violation of Section 3-811,
requires mandatory discharge.
In re Riviere, 183
Ill. App. 3d 456, 539 N.E.2d 451, 132 Ill. Dec. 141 (3d Dist. 1989); In
re Johnson, 191 Ill. App. 3d 93, 546 N.E.2d 1176, 138 Ill. Dec. 121 (3d
Dist. 1989); In re Satterlee, 148 Ill. App. 3d 84, 499 N.E.2d
101, 101 Ill. Dec. 734 (4th Dist. 1986); In re Elkow, 167 Ill.
App. 3d 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118 Ill. Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Untimely
filing of a petition, in violation of Section 3-611, requires reversal.
In re R.C., 175
Ill.
App. 3d 163, 529 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 1988). Although Section 3-503 requires a minor to be
examined prior to admission, according to the Appellate Court, this section
does not require examination prior to the
minor's arrival at the hospital.
Instead, if the minor is examined within a reasonable time after
arriving at the hospital, Section 3-503 has been followed.
In re Shirley, 154
Ill.
App. 3d 850, 507 N.E.2d 503, 107 Ill.
Dec. 590 (4th Dist. 1987). No requirement that second petition, filed after
voluntary dismissal of original petition, be filed within twenty-four hours
after admission because second petition was brought under Art. VII, not Art. VI
and 3-611 was not applicable. Mental Health Code does not prohibit voluntary
dismissal of petition and refiling of new petition where bona fide effort made
to procure hearing on original petition and when that failed, new petition was
immediately filed. (Record silent as to whether respondent had been discharged
upon dismissal of original petition.)
In re Smith, 145
Ill.
App. 3d 1002, 496 N.E.2d 497, 99 Ill.
Dec. 804 (4th Dist. 1986). Untimely 3-813 petition requires reversal;
respondent entitled to discharge despite intervening petition.
In re Whittenberg,
143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 493 N.E.2d
662, 97 Ill. Dec. 855 (4th
Dist. 1986). The petition for
involuntary admission was filed more than 5 business days after the
respondent's written request for discharge in violation of Section 3-403. Even though trial counsel had made no
objection, because the statutory violation was readily apparent on the face of
the record, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for admission.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
A(2). Petition/Certificates: Form
In re Denise C., 348 Ill. App. 3d 889, 810 N.E.2d 654, 284 Ill. Dec. 864 (1st Dist. 2004). A petition that fails to list relatives or friends or to indicate that a diligent inquiry was made to locate them is fatally defective. 405 ILCS 5/30601(b)(2). Commitment order not reversed where respondent refused to give information, evidence showed a diligent effort was made to find respondent’s relatives and friends, and there was no prejudice to the respondent.
In re Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769, 803 N.E.2d 1067, 281 Ill. Dec. 446 (2d Dist. 2004). State failed to indicate name and address of substitute decision maker or to state that diligent inquiry had been taken to determine if one existed in a petition for involuntary admission. The error was considered harmless because the respondent at trial or on appeal did not allege that he had executed a declaration of mental health treatment or that a substitute decision maker existed.
In re Joseph S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 599, 791 N.E.2d 80, 274 Ill. Dec. 284 (1st Dist. 2003). While it is reversible error when petition alleges
one basis for involuntary admission and State only proves up the other basis
(In re Moore, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 226 Ill. Dec.
858, 686 N.E.2d 641 (1st Dist. 1997), here the petition alleged inability
to provide for basic physical needs, the State proved that element, and the
court made a specific finding of inability to provide.
Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 566 N.E.2d 1365,
153 Ill. Dec. 1365 (1991),Towne v. Town of Libertyville,
190 Ill. App. 3d 563, 546 N.E.2d 810, 137 Ill. Dec. 865 (2nd Dist. 1989).
When determining whether a petition states a cause of action, the court must
take all well-pleaded facts in the challenged petition as true; however, conclusions
of law will not be taken as true, unless supported by specific factual allegations
that form the basis of such conclusions. Thus, if, after deleting the conclusions
that are pleaded, there are not sufficient allegations of fact to state a
cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be granted regardless of whether
it informs the defendant in a general way of the nature of the claim against
him.
In re Demir,
322 Ill. App. 3d 989, 751 N.E.2d 616, 256
Ill. Dec. 226 (4th Dist.
2001). Police deputies took the respondent
to a mental health facility, but, once there, the facility social worker,
not the police, filled out the petition for admission. Using de novo review, the Appellate Court
ruled that, when "the officer believes a person is in need of involuntary
commitment [and transports the person to a mental health facility], the officer
must then fill out the petition as required by section 3-606."
Having denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, and having granted
the petition for involuntary admission, the trial court erred, and its order
was reversed.
In re George O.,
314 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 734 N.E.2d
13, 248 Ill. Dec. 305 (3rd
Dist. 2000). The Appellate Court
reviewed de novo the respondent's
allegations of statutory noncompliance and reversed the trial court's order for
involuntary admission because the first certificate did not contain all of the
allegations required by Section 3-602, the first certificate was not timely
filed, and the second certificate was not clearly shown to have been executed
by a psychiatrist as required by Section 3-610.
In re Bert W., 313
Ill.
App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246
Ill.
Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000).
According to the Appellate Court in its review of this civil commitment
case, the State is statutorily required to provide, in the petition, the names
of witnesses who could testify to the events alleged in the petition. But, if the trial court allows a witness to
testify, even though he was not named in the petition, the court does not abuse
its discretion "where the identity of such witnesses is disclosed
elsewhere on the face of the petition" or where the identity of such
witnesses could be ascertained by counsel's "due diligence" and no
undue prejudice is shown. Here, even
though the petition referred only to an unnamed "caseworker," that
caseworker was allowed to testify at the hearing, and the trial court's order
for admission was affirmed on appeal.
In re Robinson, 287
Ill. App. 3d 1088, 679 N.E.2d
818, 223 Ill. Dec. 367 (4th
Dist. 1997). In this consolidated case,
the Appellate Court affirmed the order for admission, finding that procedural
irregularities had been waived and were harmless: (1) although the petition for
admission did not list the names of relatives, an attachment to the petition
listed the name of a sister, and (2) although the return of service portion of
the petition was not signed, a progress note admitted into evidence proved that
the respondent did receive a copy of the petition.
In re Ellis, 284
Ill.
App. 3d 691, 672 N.E.2d 893, 220 Ill.
Dec. 76 (3rd Dist. 1996). In
violation of Section 3-610, the State failed to show that the respondent had
been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission. And, in violation of Section 3-601, the State
failed to list the names of the respondent’s family on the petition. Thus, the trial court’s order for involuntary
admission was reversed.
In re Weissing (4th
Dist. 1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d
737, 593 N.E.2d 1137, 171 Ill.
Dec. 317; In re Adams (4th
Dist. 1993), 239 Ill. App. 3d
880, 607 N.E.2d 681, 180 Ill.
Dec. 612. Petition fatally defective where no indication of names and addresses
of relatives and friends or diligent effort to locate them. Error recognized
despite lack of objection at trial and respondent's attempt to voluntarily
admit himself. Nau distinguished; where outcome of the hearing "may
have been prejudiced by State's failure to strictly comply with the Code,
reversal…is proper. The error...may have been prejudicial.."
In re Hilton, 189
Ill.
App. 3d 821, 545 N.E.2d 757, 137 Ill.
Dec. 104 (3d Dist. 1989). Certificate signed by a doctor as a physician, rather
than a psychiatrist, does not violate 3-703 where there is a lack of any
evidence that the physician did not meet the statutory qualifications for a
psychiatrist. Physician testified at the hearing and there was a general
stipulation to her qualifications. Distinguishes In re Stone, 178
Ill.
App. 3d 1084, 534 N.E.2d 213 (3d Dist. 1989), where no stipulation to same
physician's qualifications, and reversal was the result of her signature as
"physician" on second certificate.
In re Ingersoll,
188 Ill. App. 3d 364, 544 N.E.2d
409, 135 Ill. Dec. 913 (3d Dist.
1989). Certified social worker is clinical social worker for purpose of Section
1-122, and any objections to qualifications were waived by failure to object at
hearing.
In re Franklin, 186
Ill. App. 3d 245, 541 N.E.2d 168,
133 Ill. Dec. 331 (4th Dist.
1989). Errors visible on face of the record are not waivable and are reviewable
under a doctrine analogous to plain error.
Record fails to reflect court order for
examination (3-702), 36 hours notice of such examination (3-705) or delivery to
respondent of copy of petition, order for examination, and statement of rights
(3-705). Record demonstrates notice served on same DMHDD employee who signed
petition; 3-705 does not allow substitute service. Failure to provide timely
examination. 3-704.
In re Elkow, 167 Ill. App. 3d 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118
Ill. Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Petition must
specify MHDD Code section under which it is brought.
In re Hightshoe,
155 Ill. App. 3d 371, 508 N.E.2d
488, 108 Ill. Dec. 327 (4th Dist.
1987). First certificate, executed in Indiana by Indiana physician, included an
illegible signature. Issue of physician's, and thus certificate's, compliance
with Illinois requirements waived
where not raised at trial. The court considered the question of the physician's
licensure to practice in Illinois
to require speculation, and thus validity of the certificate was not suitable
for review as analogous to plain error because the error was not readily
apparent from the record.
In re Wheeler, 152
Ill.
App. 3d 371, 504 N.E.2d 524, 105 Ill.
Dec. 424 (2d Dist. 1987). Technical deficiencies in certificate (not based
entirely on personal observation although personal exam made) did not affect
trial court's power to order involuntary admission where no challenge made to sufficiency
of evidence.
In re Pritchett,
148 Ill. App. 3d 746, 499 N.E.2d
1029, 102 Ill. Dec. 249 (4th
Dist. 1986). Failure of examining physician to give 3-208 warnings bars
subsequent testimony by examiner only if respondent's statements used to form diagnosis.
In re Collins, 102
Ill.
App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill.
Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Certificates are not substantive evidence and cannot
be basis for involuntary hospitalization. Failure of examiner to personally
give 3-208 statement of rights, with particularity, bars testimony of examiner
at hearing.
In re Porter, 98
Ill.
App. 3d 869, 424 N.E.2d 952, 54 Ill.
Dec. 202 (3d Dist. 1981). Where two examiners are present with respondent and
first examiner gives respondent his rights but second examiner does not, rights
sufficiently accorded if two interviews occurred in immediate succession.
Respondent's waiver his right to remain silent given where he stated he
understood his rights and did not want to talk anymore, but then stated he
wanted to talk and exam proceeded. Distinguishes Rizer, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 795, 409 N.E.2d 383 (1st Dist. 1980) where second exam came two days
after first.
In re Evans, 86
Ill.
App. 3d 263, 408 N.E.2d 33, 41 Ill.
Dec. 687 (4th Dist. 1980). Certificates serve to establish probable cause for
emergency admission, but are not evidence and cannot be used to support
involuntary admission order.
In re Wilson, 41 Ill. App. 3d
522, 353 N.E.2d 681 (1st Dist. 1976). According to the Appellate Court, although
"vague," the petition for emergency admission, which described the
respondent as "violent, destructive, uncontrollable and bizarre,"
provided adequate reasons for admission and adequate notice to the respondent
of the issues to be raised at the commitment hearing. Finding no error, the Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court's order for admission.
People v. Ralls, 23
Ill. App. 3d 96, 318 N.E.2d 703
(5th Dist. 1974). Failure to provide specific reasons why respondent is in need
of mental treatment in certificate renders emergency hospitalization improper.
In re Gerich, 22
Ill.
App. 3d 575, 317 N.E.2d 724 (1st Dist. 1974). The petition for respondent's admission
referred to the attached certificate as the source of factual allegations
supporting the need for respondent's hospitalization and as the source of
witnesses with knowledge of those allegations.
The certificate alleged that respondent was confused, disoriented,
without financial means, and unable to care for himself. Reading the two documents together, the Appellate
Court found that the petition substantially complied with the requirements of
the Mental Health Code, and the Court affirmed the trial court's order for
involuntary admission.
People v. Sansone,
18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d
733 (1st Dist. 1974). It is statutorily incumbent upon State to provide
information as to names of witnesses who may prove facts alleged in petition.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
A(3). Petition/Certificates:
Service of petition/notice
In re Jill R.,
336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 785 N.E.2d 46, 271 Ill. Dec. 395 (4th Dist. 2003) Despite
the compelling need for strict compliance with involuntary commitment statutes,
where the respondent did not challenge the lack of notice at the hearing,
where the purpose behind the notice requirement has been fulfilled, and where
respondent was not prejudiced by the lack of notice, failure to serve respondent
with notice of hearing is harmless error.
In re Robinson,
287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 679 N.E.2d
818, 223 Ill. Dec. 367 (4th
Dist. 1997). In this consolidated case,
the Appellate Court affirmed the order for admission, finding that procedural
irregularities had been waived and were harmless: (1) although the petition
for admission did not list the names of relatives, an attachment to the petition
listed the name of a sister, and (2) although the return of service portion
of the petition was not signed, a progress note admitted into evidence proved
that the respondent did receive a copy of the petition.
In re Martens, 269
Ill.
App. 3d 324, 646 N.E.2d 27, 206 Ill.
Dec. 895 (2nd Dist. 1995).
Although the absence of the required notice to the respondent's guardian
did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, the error did
require the reversal of the trial court's order for involuntary admission. The State failed to meet its burden of
showing that notice had been given, and the absence of notice was not harmless
because whether the respondent was able to meet his basic physical needs was
related to the duties of his guardian.
In re Luker, 255
111. App. 3d 367, 627 N.E.2d 1166, 194 Ill.
Dec. 524 (4th Dist. 1993). Lack of proof of service of petition on respondent,
and (either) untimely filing of petition or untimely psychiatric exam all
waived. Dissent: errors are apparent on the face of the record and not
harmless.
In re Nau, 153
Ill.
2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134, 180 Ill.
Dec. 240 (1992). Because he had been served
with notice of hearing prior to the filing of the petition for admission, the
respondent alleged that he had not been served with notice at the direction of
the court as required by the Mental Health Code. The Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial
court's order for admission, however, because the respondent and his attorney
had received actual notice, had made no objection and had explicitly agreed at
trial that there was no issue as to service, and had not alleged any prejudice
on appeal. In so doing, the Supreme
Court explicitly overruled, to the extent inconsistent with its decision in
this case, King, Long, and Price.
In re Splett, 143
Ill.
2d 225, 572 N.E.2d 883, 157 Ill.
Dec. 419 (1991). The Appellate Court had held that, where the notice form
failed to demonstrate service on respondent, the trial court's order for
admission must be reversed. The Supreme Court agreed that involuntary admission
proceedings implicate serious liberty interests, but declined to enforce
reversal for the record's failure to reflect affirmative proof of formal notice
when both the respondent and counsel received actual notice, respondent's trial
counsel made no objection and made no request for a continuance, and prejudice
was neither alleged nor evident.
In re Devine, 214
Ill.
App. 3d 1, 572 N.E.2d 1238, 157 Ill.
Dec. 774 (2nd Dist. 1991).
Absence of notarization on proof of service did not affect the validity
of service. Both the respondent and counsel appeared at
the hearing, neither objected, and there was no claim of prejudice. Thus, the trial court's order was affirmed.
In re Lamb, 202
Ill.
App. 3d 725, 560 N.E.2d 422, 148 Ill.
Dec. 120 (2nd Dist. 1990). Trial court, not state agency, must set hearing
date, and notice must be served under court's direction as required by 3-706.
Where notice neither issued nor served under court's direction, respondent not
properly served with notice.
In re Riviere, 183
Ill.
App. 3d 456, 539 N.E.2d 451, 132 Ill.
Dec. 141 (3d Dist. 1989); In re Elkow, 167 Ill.
App. 3d 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118 Ill.
Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Failure to demonstrate proof of service of petition
on respondent within twelve hours of admission is plain error.
In re Plank, 169
Ill.
App. 3d 411, 523 N.E.2d 614, 119 Ill.
Dec. 858 (4th Dist. 1988); In re Franklin, 186 Ill.
App. 3d 245, 541 N.E.2d 168, 133 Ill.
Dec. 331 (4th Dist. 1989). Failure of record to reflect proper proof of service
of notice of hearing on respondent, as required by Sections 3-611 and 3-706, is
reversible error.
In re King, 148
Ill.
App. 3d 741, 499 N.E.2d 1032, 102 Ill.
Dec. 252 (4th Dist. 1986); In re Price, 152 Ill.
App. 3d 960, 505 N.E.2d 37, 105 Ill.
Dec. 911 (4th Dist. 1987). Notice served prior to filing of petition is
improper service of notice; return portion also incomplete. [Both cases
overruled in In re Nau.]
Snavely v. Snavely,
349 Ill. App. 369, 110 N.E.2d 685
(1st Dist. 1953). Where notice was not served on respondent until day of
hearing, order for involuntary commitment was void for want of jurisdiction.
Eddy v. People, 15
Ill.
386 (1854). Notice to alleged "lunatic" necessary as a general
principle of law, and should affirmatively appear of record.
Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz,
135 Ill. 591 (1891). Statutory
requirement that notice "shall" issue and be served upon respondent
is mandatory; finding entered without proof of such notice properly excluded in
later proceeding, inasmuch as it was void for want of jurisdiction.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
A(4). Petition/Certificates: Voluntary recipients
In re N.S., No. 4-04-0942 (4th Dist. Sept. 7, 2005), 2005 WL 2821816, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1065. Proceedings for involuntary admission cannot proceed on a voluntarily admitted patient unless the patient has filed a written request for discharge and has not rescinded that request in writing within five days. 405 ILCS 5/3-403. A checkmark in the petition for involuntary admission that a written request for discharge was made is not evidence.
In re N.S., No. 4-04-0942 (4th Dist. Sept. 7, 2005), 2005 WL 2821816, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1065. The Code affords greater rights to voluntarily admitted patients than to those involuntarily admitted. This reflects a legislative intent to encourage voluntary admissions. This policy is based on psychiatric evidence indicating a patient is more likely to be rehabilitated when undertaking treatment voluntarily than when therapy is forced upon him.
In re James E. , 207 Ill. 2d 105, 797 N.E.2d 622, 278 Ill. Dec. 27 (2003). If it can no
longer adequately treat a patient voluntarily admitted under 3-403, a private
hospital may file a petition for involuntary admission against a patient who
has not requested his discharge in writing because, unlike a state hospital,
it lacks the legal means to transfer the patient to a different facility to
ensure he receives appropriate treatment. This scenario is a narrow exception
to the rule espoused in In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314,
465 N.E.2d 98 (1984), which is expressly preserved, that a written request
for discharge must precede the institution of involuntary commitment proceedings against a voluntarily admitted patient. James E. reaffirmed
the holding in Hays that one of the purposes
of the Mental Health Code is to encourage voluntary admissions and that patients
who voluntarily undertake treatment are more likely to be rehabilitated. Hays
was expressly not overruled.
Wilson
v. Formigoni (N.D. Ill.
1993), 832 F. Supp. 1152. Discussion of the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy
with respect to recipient rights. Actual circumstances of confinement must
be analyzed rather than placing reliance on technical label of status. Lack
of viable alternative may result in essential involuntary commitment despite
voluntary status. In this damage action for injuries after escape, some evidence
of affirmative action in form of coercion on part of state to retain Wilson
in custody; voluntary status-allegedly not entirely knowing.
In re Bennett, 251
Ill.
App. 3d 887, 623 N.E.2d 942, 191 Ill.
Dec. 352 (4th Dist. 1992). Uncontroverted testimony that patient had been
voluntary and had submitted written request for discharge constituted
sufficient evidence that he had done so. Weimer, Splett and Macedo
merely hold involuntary admission improper where record indicates no evidence
of written request. Also, the trial court did not err in rejecting patient's
renewed request to be voluntarily admitted because the patient did not
recognize his need for treatment and had a "history of abusing the
voluntary admission process."
In re Lawrence, 239
Ill. App. 3d 424, 607 N.E.2d 659,
180 Ill. Dec. 590 (2d Dist.
1992). Failure to reaffirm desire to continue treatment under Section 3-404 is
not the equivalent of 3-403 notice of desire to be discharged so as to allow
State to institute involuntary admission proceedings. While in some instances
failure to reaffirm might be properly recorded in such a way as to satisfy the
"written notice" requirement of 3-403, record must reflect submission
of effective request for discharge; this record contains no such evidence
because the notation on the petition is not evidence.
In re Splett, 143
Ill.
2d 225, 572 N.E.2d 883, 157 Ill.
Dec. 419 (1991). While not adopting the reasoning of the Appellate Court, the
Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the Appellate Court’s reversal of the trial
court’s order because the record failed to reflect that Splett, a voluntary
recipient, had submitted a written discharge request prior to a petition having
been filed, citing In re Hays.
In re Weimer, 219
Ill.
App. 3d 1005, 580 N.E.2d 182, 162 Ill.
Dec. 556 (2nd Dist. 1991). Petition asserted voluntary patient had submitted
written notice of desire to be discharged, but petition and certificates serve
"only as a showing of probable cause to initiate the hearing...and [are]
not evidence." Waiver inapplicable per Hays. State's attempt to
supplement the record on appeal with evidence of written request rejected.
Section 3-403 must be strictly adhered to under Splett; the written
request for discharge must be part of the record at the time of the hearing.
Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113
(1990). Person who is willing to sign voluntary admission forms but is
incapable of making informed decision is unlikely to benefit from voluntary
patient's statutory right to seek discharge. He is thus in danger of indefinite
confinement without the benefit of procedural safeguards of the involuntary
admission process, which might include non-confined (outpatient) treatment.
In re Guthrie, 196
Ill.
App. 3d 352, 553 N.E.2d 735, 143 Ill.
Dec. 28 (3d Dist. 1990). Affirmative showing that five-day filing requirement
was not met is reversible error. Unlike Macedo, in this case, the record
demonstrates no written request for discharge, but one of the certificates
referred to its execution by respondent, the date of its expiration, and
failure of respondent to rescind.
Mandatory requirement in 3-403 of discharge or timely filing of petition
cannot be avoided by referring to other sections of the MHDD Code to justify
non-compliance.
In re Stone, 178
Ill.
App. 3d 1084, 534 N.E.2d 213, 128 Ill.
Dec. 193 (3d Dist. 1989). Record must reflect new psychiatric examination and
certificate where new petition is filed against voluntary patient who has
requested discharge.
In re Ingersoll,
188 Ill. App. 3d 364, 544 N.E.2d
409, 135 Ill. Dec. 913 (3d Dist.
1989). Failure to attach discharge request to petition waived where petition
and certificates referred to discharge request and it was confirmed in
respondent's testimony.
In re Price, 152
Ill.
App. 3d 960, 505 N.E.2d 37, 105 Ill.
Dec. 911 (4th Dist. 1987). Involuntary admission proceedings against a
voluntary patient must be preceded by the patient's written request for
discharge.
In re Macedo, 150
Ill.
App. 3d 673, 502 N.E.2d 72, 103 Ill.
Dec. 925 (4th Dist. 1986). Written request for discharge must precede
involuntary admission proceedings against voluntary patient. Because 16 year
old respondent was admitted as a voluntary recipient under 3-502, provisions of
Art. IV apply to involuntary hospitalization efforts, not 3-503. Request for
discharge must accompany petition; mental health center must maintain a record
of the request, as all records.
In re Whittenberg,
143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 493 N.E.2d
662, 97 Ill. Dec. 855 (4th Dist.
1986). Petition filed more than five days after request for discharge by
voluntary patient is untimely and requires reversal.
In re Hays, 115
Ill.
App. 3d 686, 451 N.E.2d 9, 71 Ill.
Dec. 521 (4th Dist. 1983) aff'd. 102 Ill.
2d 314, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984). Rights accorded voluntary patients in MHDD Code
demonstrate legislative intent to encourage voluntary admissions. State could
not initiate involuntary admission proceedings against a voluntary patient who
had not made a written request for discharge.
In re Rusick, 115
Ill.
App. 3d 108, 450 N.E.2d 418, 70 Ill.
Dec. 945 (5th Dist. 1983). No error in denying respondent's request for
voluntary admission, where record indicated that he had a recent history of
admissions, that he was not always able to assess his need for treatment, that
the facility director had not approved his voluntary admission, and that there
was testimony that prior voluntary admissions had resulted in premature
requests for discharge.
In re Hall, 92
Ill.
App. 3d 1136, 416 N.E.2d 731, 48 Ill.
Dec. 458 (4th Dist. 1981).
The Appellate Court affirmed the order for respondent's involuntary
admission, even though the respondent had wanted to sign an application for
voluntary admission, because the respondent did not recognize the need for
treatment and his doctor opined that involuntary admission would be more
appropriate.
People v. Hill, 72
Ill.
App. 3d 638, 391 N.E.2d 51, 28 Ill.
Dec. 852 (1st Dist. 1979); In re Clement, 34 Ill.
App. 3d 574, 340 N.E.2d 217 (1st Dist. 1975); In re Meyer, 107
Ill.
App. 3d 871, 438 N.E.2d 639, 63 Ill.
Dec. 708 (2d Dist. 1982). Order entered for involuntary admission of voluntary
patient who has not requested discharge is void.
Montague v. George J. London
Memorial Hosp., 78 Ill.
App. 3d 298, 396 N.E.2d 1289, 33 Ill.
Dec. 565 (1st Dist. 1979). Failure to release voluntary patient or cause
petition to be filed within five days of request for discharge gave rise to
civil action for damages for violation of statutory procedures.
In re Byrd, 68
Ill.
App. 3d 849, 386 N.E.2d 385, 25 Ill.
Dec. 114 (1st Dist. 1979). Evidence must be adduced to demonstrate why
voluntary admission would be inadequate and why involuntary admission is
necessary in order for court to deny request for voluntary admission.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
A(5). Petition/Certificates:
In general
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that proceedings to extend involuntary admissions are subject to the same provisions of the Code as those governing initial involuntary admissions. 405 ILCS 5/3-813(b).
Chapala v. Hoffman Estates Police Dep't, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2004). Commitment of a police officer by his superiors to a mental hospital did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers had probable cause to believe that the officer was mentally ill and was a danger to himself or others.
In re Moore, 292
Ill.
App. 3d 1069, 686 N.E.2d 641, 226 Ill.
Dec. 858 (1st Dist. 1997). In
the petition for involuntary admission, the State alleged that the respondent
was likely to inflict serious physical harm, but, at the hearing, the State
presented evidence only that the respondent was unable to meet her basic
physical needs. The Appellate Court
reversed the trial court’s order for admission, applying the general rule
applicable in all civil cases that prohibits a party’s recovery after having
alleged one cause of action but having proven another.
Olsen v. Karwoski,
68 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 386 N.E.2d
444, 25 Ill. Dec. 173 (1st Dist.
1979). Emergency admission to a mental hospital is an extreme step and should
not be used except in true emergencies.
In re Presswood, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 104, 366 N.E.2d 442, 9 Ill.
Dec. 185 (1st Dist. 1977). Involuntary hospitalization is a deprivation of
liberty as would be imprisonment.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
B(1). Clear and Convincing Evidence:
Mental illness
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). For a medical opinion as to the existence of a mental illness to be clear and convincing, it is sufficient if the expert indicates the basis of his diagnosis by having directly observed a respondent on several occasions:
In re Reed, 291
Ill.
App. 3d 1084, 685 N.E.2d 391, 226 Ill.
Dec. 288 (3rd Dist. 1997).
The petition for admission alleged that the respondent was mentally ill
and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm. At the hearing, however, the doctor testified
that the respondent was developmentally disabled but only suggested that the
respondent might also have a mental illness.
The trial court ordered the respondent’s admission, but the Appellate
Court reversed, holding that the State had failed to prove that the respondent
was mentally ill.
In re Robinson, 151
Ill. 2d 126, 176 Ill.
Dec. 14, 601 N.E.2d 712
(1992). State must show that respondent's mental illness substantially impairs
his functioning. "Substantial impairment" means, to justify
involuntary treatment, mental illness serious enough to create reasonable
expectation that respondent will inflict serious harm upon himself or another
in the near future, or that respondent will be unable to provide for his own
care and protection.
In re Ingersoll, 188
Ill. App. 3d 364, 544 N.E.2d 409,
135 Ill. Dec. 913 (3d Dist.
1989). Illness must substantially impair respondent's thought process,
perception of reality, emotional stability, judgment, behavior or ability to
cope with life's ordinary demands.
People v. Lang, 113
Ill. 2d 407, 498 N.E.2d 1105, 101
Ill. Dec. 597 (1986). Section
1-119 requires not merely finding of mental illness but also that one is
reasonably expected to present a serious danger to self or others because of
the illness. The mental illness must substantially impair thought, perception
of reality, emotional process, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with
ordinary demands of life.
In re Marquardt,
100 Ill. App. 3d 741, 427 N.E.2d
411, 56 Ill. Dec. 331 (1st Dist.
1981). Where only evidence that substance abuse is a mental illness is
reference to it in DSM-III and physician's statement that drug abuse is
recognized by psychiatric profession as a mental illness, no clear and
convincing evidence of mental illness.
People v. Reliford,
65 Ill. App. 3d 177, 382 N.E.2d
72 (1st Dist. 1978). Mere status of mental illness or mental retardation
without further rationale or inquiry is insufficient to justify involuntary
commitment; must be causal connection between illness and dangerousness to comport
with due process.
People v. Bradley,
22 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 318 N.E.2d
267 (1st Dist. 1974). Evidence of mental illness alone is insufficient to
support an order for involuntary admission.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
B(2). Clear and Convincing Evidence:
Harm
In re Tyrone S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 495, 791 N.E.2d 157, 274 Ill. Dec. 361 (1st Dist. 2003), appeal denied by 205 Ill. 2d 584, 803 N.E.2d 483, 281 Ill. Dec. 79 (2003). To prove a person is reasonably expected to inflict harm on himself or another, the State must present clear and convincing evidence in the form of explicit medical testimony given by a psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist who examined the person. Such testimony is considered clear and convincing if the medical expert bases his or her diagnosis on direct observation of the patient. Proof of actual harm inflicted by the person is not required.
In re Tyrone S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 495, 791 N.E.2d 157, 274 Ill. Dec. 361 (1st Dist. 2003), appeal denied by 205 Ill. 2d 584, 803 N.E.2d 483, 281 Ill. Dec. 79 (2003). Trial court's determination that respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon another person was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Psychiatrist gave an explicit opinion as to the danger respondent was likely to pose to others if discharged, and she had a more than adequate factual basis for this opinion, including numerous personal observations of patient's lewd and physically combative behavior toward other patients and staff. A witness corroborated psychiatrist’s assertions through his own testimony that respondent attempted to strike, scratch, and kick staff members.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Generally, the inability to care for oneself so as to guard against physical harm is found when the illness substantially impairs one's thought processes, perception of reality, emotional stability, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with life's ordinary demands.
In re O.C. , 338 Ill. App. 3d 292, 788 N.E.2d 116, 273 Ill. Dec. 287 (4th Dist. 2003). Despite explicit medical testimony
that respondent could unknowingly act out, respondent’s boisterous and loud
behavior, and a statement by respondent such as “I’m going to kill you,” there
was no evidence respondent ever harmed himself or anyone else, evidence showed
that any threats that he had made were made to no one in particular, and respondent
said he “told people off” to relieve his frustrations; therefore, there was
no evidence presented that respondent was reasonably expected to act out by
inflicting serious physical harm upon himself or another as a result of his
mental illness.
In re Bert W., 313
Ill. App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d
591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st
Dist. 2000). Evidence that the respondent
said he would "kick [his outpatient caseworker's] ass … or something
similar to that" if he were not allowed to buy his own groceries and
that, once admitted to the hospital, he was angry, loud, and verbally aggressive
constituted clear and convincing evidence that he was reasonably expected
to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future,
and, on appeal, the trial court's order for involuntary admission was affirmed.
In re Moore, 301
Ill.
App. 3d 759, 704 N.E.2d 442, 235 Ill.
Dec. 93 (4th Dist. 1999).
Rejecting the de novo standard to review the respondent’s argument that
the State had not proved him reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm, the Court found that, given the evidence of the respondent’s depression,
alcohol abuse, and past suicide attempts, the trial court’s order was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re M.A., 293
Ill.
App. 3d 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill.
Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998). In
this consolidated case, after declining to apply the mootness doctrine, the
Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s order for admission. The order for in-patient admission was not
manifestly erroneous because the respondent had told a nurse to “watch” herself
when walking to the parking lot and had struggled with sheriff’s deputies,
establishing that she was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm,
and, because the doctor opined that alternatives to hospitalization were not
appropriate, establishing that hospitalization was the least restrictive
alternative.
In re Schumaker,
260 Ill. App. 3d 723, 633 N.E.2d
169, 198 Ill. Dec. 707 (2nd
Dist. 1994). To satisfy its burden of
proof, the State must present an explicit medical opinion and factual evidence
that the respondent intends to harm someone.
In this case, there was no explicit medical opinion, and evidence that
the respondent was verbally abusive was insufficient. Thus, the Appellate Court reversed the trial
court's order because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Friberg, 249
App. 3d 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill.
Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). Affirming the
trial court's order, the Appellate Court ruled that testimony that the
respondent restrained his mother prior to admission and broke a window and
threatened to kill staff after admission constituted clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious
physical harm.
In re Hilton, 189
Ill.
App. 3d 821, 545 N.E.2d 757, 137 Ill.
Dec. 104 (3d Dist. 1989). Testimony that
the respondent was bipolar and delusional, abused alcohol, threatened to kill
hospital staff, claimed to have killed a policeman in the past, and believed
that violence was an effective response to difficult interpersonal relations
established that he was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm in
the near future.
In re Cutsinger,
186 Ill. App. 3d 219, 542 N.E.2d
414, 134 Ill. Dec. 235 (2d Dist.
1989). Facts upon which medical opinion is based as well as medical testimony
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Testimony that respondent was
verbally abusive, without clear and convincing evidence of harm to self or
others or threats thereof, insufficient basis for opinion. (While petition
alleged inability to provide for physical needs so as to guard self from
serious harm, and testimony so indicated, certificates, including one from
physician who testified, did not so indicate, and court made finding on premise
of harm to self or others; State did not raise inability to guard on appeal).
In re Orr, 176
Ill.
App. 3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64, 125 Ill.
Dec. 885 (4th Dist. 1988). Hearsay evidence can be used to form opinion if it
is type reasonably relied upon by experts.
Psychiatric history of patient in conjunction with expert's personal
observations can be used to support opinion as to dangerousness.
Sullivan v. Hay,
140 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 489 N.E.2d
889 (5th Dist. 1986). Testimony of medical expert based in part on past events
is sufficient for determination of current mental illness and dangerousness.
In re Cochran, 139
Ill.
App. 3d 198, 487 N.E.2d 389, 93 Ill.
Dec. 722 (5th Dist. 1985). Involuntary hospitalization requires explicit
medical testimony that as a direct result of mental illness respondent can be
expected to harm self or others. Facts
upon which medical opinion is based as well as medical testimony must be
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. Hearsay evidence that respondent
knocked medications from nurse's hand insufficient. Delusions alone are
insufficient to support finding of need for involuntary admission; must
demonstrate reasonable expectation that respondent will seriously harm someone
in the near future as a result thereof.
People v. Nunn, 108
Ill. App. 3d 169, 438 N.E.2d
1342, 64 Ill. Dec. 23 (1st Dist.
1982). Decision to commit must be based on present conduct and state of mind;
cannot be based on possibility that respondent would inflict harm if failed to
take medication in future, and refusal to take meds is not sufficient to
justify commitment--such an order would "lead to the unacceptable result
of permanent detention". Evidence did not demonstrate refusal to take
medication and seemed to indicate contrary. Order must be based upon danger as
a direct result of mental illness, i.e., there must be a causal connection.
People v. Czyz, 92
Ill.
App. 3d 21, 416 N.E.2d 1, 48 Ill.
Dec. 106 (1st Dist. 1980). Decision to involuntarily admit must be based upon
present conduct and state of mind; respondent entitled to current evaluation.
Evidence of mental illness less than one month before hearing, despite expert
testimony that few persons are considered completely recovered from a prior
mental illness in such a period, not clear and convincing evidence of current
mental illness. Also, where expert testified that "it all depends on
stresses he will meet", no explicit opinion of dangerousness to others.
In re Powell, 85
Ill.
App. 3d 877, 407 N.E.2d 658, 41 Ill.
Dec. 160 (1st Dist. 1980). Expert testimony that respondent's delusions about
money owed him would cause him to pursue collection attempts and this would
place him in position of harming others is clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness.
People v. Lang, 76
Ill.
2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979). Criminal charge of UST defendant, found innocent
in "innocent only" hearing, cannot be used to establish dangerousness
for subsequent involuntary commitment.
People v. Fields,
60 Ill. App .3d 869, 377 N.E.2d
301 (1st Dist. 1978). Isolated incident of public nudity and suicide threat,
which respondent indicated she never intended to carry out and where no
attempts to harm self, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness to self. Evidence that respondent adequately cared for personal
hygiene, finances, food and clothing demonstrated ability to care for self.
In re Bradley, 22
Ill.
App. 3d 1076, 318 N.E.2d 267 (1st Dist. 1974). Through sworn testimony from a doctor, and
through unsworn testimony of an
unidentified social worker, the State presented testimony that the respondent
had had been violent in a courtroom after having been charged with disorderly
conduct at the hospital bedside of his wife and the expert opinion that the
respondent "could conceivably" be dangerous. The respondent testified that he had never
been asked to leave his wife's bedside and that he was assaulted from behind by
the courtroom bailiffs. The trial court
committed the respondent, but the Appellate Court reversed, ruling that neither
the opinion nor its factual basis was clear and convincing.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
B(3). Clear and Convincing Evidence:
Needs
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). In determining whether a person's illness renders her unable to provide for her basic physical needs, a court should consider whether that person (1) can obtain her own food, shelter, or necessary medical care; (2) has a place to live or a family to assist her; (3) is able to function in society; and (4) has an understanding of money or a concern for money as a means of sustenance.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The evidence to support these findings that respondent is mentally ill and cannot support herself must concern the respondent's current condition, and the decision to commit the respondent must be based on a fresh evaluation of her conduct and mental state.
In re Emmett J., 333 Ill. App. 3d 69, 266 Ill. Dec. 631, 775
N.E.2d 193 (3rd Dist. 2002). The respondent was delusional, refused
to take psychotropic medication, was uncertain where he would live if discharged
from the hospital, was estranged from his family, and had been in either a
treatment facility or jail for the past 10 years. As a result, the Appellate
Court ruled that the trial court's finding that he was unable to provide for
his basic physical needs was not manifestly erroneous.
In re Jakush, 311
Ill.
App. 3d 940, 725 N.E.2d 785, 244 Ill.
Dec. 312 (4th Dist. 2000).
Finding that the respondent had no visible means of support and that it
was "only a matter of time" before she would be the victim of a "violent
act," the trial court found that the respondent was unable to meet her
basic physical needs and ordered her to be involuntarily hospitalized. The Appellate Court reversed. First, being without visible means of support
is not a proper ground for involuntary admission. Second, there was no evidence that the
respondent had ever been victimized, and being vulnerable "does not
warrant preemptive confinement whereby potential victims would be incarcerated
in the interest of preventing criminals from preying upon them."
People v. Barichello,
305 Ill. App. 3d 13, 711 N.E.2d
406, 238 Ill. Dec. 303 (1st
Dist. 1999). After hearing conflicting
expert testimony, the trial court found that the UST defendant was subject to
involuntary admission. Having been
confined continuously for 14 years, the defendant had not demonstrated his
ability to meet his basic physical needs and his mental illness was not in
remission. The Appellate Court
affirmed.
In re Robinson, 287
Ill. App. 3d 1088, 679 N.E.2d
818, 223 Ill. Dec. 367 (4th
Dist. 1997). In this consolidated case,
the Appellate Court affirmed the order for admission, finding that the State
had proved that the respondent was unable to meet her basic physical needs
because she was delusional, stayed at shelters where she was robbed, and had
difficulty explaining how she would obtain food.
In re Bontrager,
286 Ill. App. 3d 226, 676 N.E.2d
4, 221 Ill. Dec. 664 (3rd
Dist. 1996). In this appeal from both an
order for involuntary admission and involuntary treatment, the Appellate Court
reversed both orders for being against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In the admission case,
although the petition claimed that the respondent had not eaten in three months,
the doctor testified that he had little information about her eating habits;
and, because the respondent testified about her discharge plan, the State had
not proven that she was unable to meet her basic physical needs.
In re Rovelstad,
281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 667 N.E.2d
720 (2nd Dist. 1996). The
trial court's finding that the respondent was unable to meet his basic physical
needs was against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented
no evidence regarding the respondent's ability to secure food and shelter but
instead presented evidence only of his mental illness and his poor hygiene.
In re Tuman, 268
Ill.
App. 3d 106, 644 N.E.2d 56, 205 Ill.
Dec. 840 (2d Dist. 1994). While evidence supporting expert opinion must not
necessarily be substantively admitted, where State offers no additional
evidence such as occurrence witness testimony or relevant documents, court must
carefully examine expert testimony to determine if it is clear and convincing
standing alone. Here expert's testimony alone was insufficient to demonstrate
that respondent was unable to guard herself from serious physical harm; no
evidence of inability to obtain shelter, food or necessary medical care or
understand the need for money.
In re Schumaker,
260 Ill. App. 3d 723, 633 N.E.2d
169, 198 Ill. Dec. 707 (2nd
Dist. 1994). The Appellate Court
reversed the trial court's order for
admission because the State presented only evidence that the respondent may
have been refusing psychotropic medication and may be unable to find a job or
balance a checkbook, and this evidence was insufficient.
In re Winters, 255
Ill.
App. 3d 605, 627 N.E.2d 410, 194 Ill.
Dec. 294 (2d Dist. 1994). "A person
may not be confined against her will merely because she is mentally ill and if
she is 'dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.'" Citing O'Connor
v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U. S.
563. Weight to be assigned expert's opinion depends upon factual basis for
opinion; expert's opinion is only as valid as reasons for it.
In this case, the State failed to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unable to
provide for her basic physical needs. Refusal of medication and lack of place
to live are insufficient grounds for involuntary admission, and there was no
factual basis for the assertions that respondent would not eat or sleep
properly, or fail to seek medical attention for perceived health problems.
In re Biggs, 219
Ill.
App. 3d 361, 579 N.E.2d 1170, 162 Ill.
Dec. 356 (4th Dist. 1991).
Admitting that the expert's testimony was not extensive, the Appellate
Court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's finding that the respondent was
unable to provide for his basic physical needs.
The respondent was delusional and might be in danger from members of the
public; moreover, the respondent was diagnosed as being bipolar and might have
trouble obtaining adequate sleep and food.
In re Phillips, 62
Ill.
App. 3d 408, 379 N.E.2d 97 (1st Dist. 1978). Failure to take medication for a
mental, as opposed to physical, disorder does not prove inability to care for
self. Uncertainty of living arrangements if released insufficient basis for
commitment.
People v. Fields,
60 Ill. App .3d 869, 377 N.E.2d
301 (1st Dist. 1978). Evidence that respondent adequately cared for personal
hygiene, finances, food and clothing demonstrated ability to care for self.
Matter of Doe, 56
Ill.
App. 3d 1052, 372 N.E.2d 866 (1st Dist. 1978). Indigency alone insufficient for
involuntary admission; impermissible to hospitalize someone merely to raise their
standard of living.
In re Love, 48
Ill.
App. 3d 517, 363 N.E.2d 21 (1st Dist. 1977). Present and future ability to care
for self, rather than past ability, is to be considered in involuntary
commitment hearing.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I(B). INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
B(4).Clear
and Convincing Evidence: Least restrictive alternative/dispositional
report/treatment plan
In re M.A., 356 Ill. App. 3d 733, 826 N.E.2d 1071, 292 Ill. Dec. 635 (1st Dist. 2005) [Note: Original case was in 1998.] Sections 3-810 and 3-811 of Mental Health Code do not require that court conduct bifurcated hearing to first determine whether respondent is subject to involuntary admission and then determine whether less restrictive alternatives are available. 405 ILCS 5/3-810 & 5/3-811.
In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The court has several options at its disposal: ordering hospitalization, ordering outpatient treatment, or ordering the person to be placed in the care of a relative or other person willing to care properly for him. However, there is a statutory preference for treatment other than hospitalization. Thus, hospitalization may only be ordered if the State proves it is the least restrictive treatment alternative . . . not met merely because the State's expert opines commitment is the least restrictive means. The opinion of the expert must be supported by the evidence.
In re Emmett J., 333 Ill. App. 3d 69, 266 Ill. Dec.
631, 775 N.E.2d 193 (3rd Dist. 2002). Where the respondent was
delusional and refused to take psychotropic medication, his placement in a
group home was not viable, and the trial court's finding that inpatient treatment
was the least restrictive alternative was not manifestly erroneous.
In
re Lawrence S., 319
Ill. App. 3d 476, 746 N.E.2d 769, 254
Ill. Dec. 1012 (2nd Dist. 2001). Because the State
completely failed to comply with Section 3-810, the trial court's order was
reversed. The State failed to file a
written dispositional report and failed to provide adequate oral
testimony. Although both of the State's experts
opined that hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative, they "neither explained the basis for [their] opinion nor mentioned any other
alternatives that were considered."
In
re E.L., 316 Ill. App.
3d 598 , 736 N.E.2d 1189, 249 Ill.
Dec. 751 (1st Dist. 2000). The
Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for involuntary admission
because the State failed to prepare the dispositional report required by Section
3-810. The document purporting to be
the dispositional report contained no information on "the appropriateness
and availability of alternative treatment settings," and, because the
respondent's counsel had objected to the lack of a proper written report,
"any oral testimony on what would have been contained in the report is
of no effect."
In re Bert W., 313
Ill.
App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill.
Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000).
Where the State's expert testifies that the respondent may be dangerous
if not confined in a hospital, the trial court's ruling that hospitalization is
the least restrictive alternative is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
In re David D., 307
Ill. App. 3d 30, 716 N.E.2d 1245,
240 Ill. Dec. 298 (2nd
Dist. 1999). The Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court's finding that inpatient hospitalization was the least
restrictive, appropriate environment in which to treat the respondent, even
though the State's expert witness presented no testimony that the respondent
had been rejected by any specific alternative treatment settings.
In re Robert H.,
302 Ill. App. 3d 980, 707 N.E.2d
264, 236 Ill. Dec. 419 (2nd
Dist. 1999). Trial court's order for
hospitalization upheld, even though the State did not submit a written
dispositional report and the State's expert witness presented no testimony that
the respondent had been rejected by any specific alternative treatment
settings.
In re M.A., 293
Ill.
App. 3d 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill.
Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998).
Because the State's expert witness opined that alternatives to
hospitalization were not appropriate, State established that hospitalization
was the least restrictive, appropriate environment for the respondent.
In re Katz, 267
Ill.
App. 3d 692, 642 N.E.2d 893, 205 Ill.
Dec. 28 (3d Dist. 1994). No requirements for showing of inpatient placement as
least restrictive alternative under 3-810 where recipient filed 3-900 Petition
for Discharge and trial court properly found she failed to present prima facie
case.
In re Luttrel, 261
Ill.
App. 3d 221, 633 N.E.2d 74, 198 Ill.
Dec. 612 (4th Dist. 1994). Failure to file current treatment plan as required
by 3-813(a) and insufficiency of oral testimony presented requires reversal of
trial court's order for hospitalization. The Code provides a statutory
preference for treatment other than hospitalization; State failed to
demonstrate that continued involuntary inpatient hospitalization was least
restrictive alternative.
In re Watts,
250 Ill, App, 3d 723, 620 N.E.2d
640, 189 Ill. Dec. 672 (5th Dist.
1993). Absence of report required by
3-810 of the Code is recognizable as plain error, relying on James, 191
Ill,
App. 3d 352. Second certificate does not qualify as 3-810 report and total
failure of compliance is clear.
In re Robinson, 151
Ill. 2d 126, 176 Ill.
Dec. 14, 601 N.E.2d 712
(1992). Legislature intended that 3-810 report be in writing, but where there
was no objection to absence of predispositional report, strict compliance is
only required where legislative intent cannot be otherwise achieved; here oral
testimony containing information required provided substantial compliance and
was adequate substitute for report prepared by facility director and error was
harmless; Blume, 197 Ill. App. 3d 552 overruled. [Section 3-810 of the
Code has since been amended to explicitly require that the dispositional report
be in writing.]
In re Long, 237
Ill.
App. 3d 105, 180 Ill. Dec. 182,
606 N.E.2d 1259 (2d Dist. 1992). Despite respondent's rejection of halfway
house option, finding that hospitalization was least restrictive alternative
was against the manifest weight of the evidence when Elgin MHC and medication
were only elements of treatment plan. Respondent's dislike of halfway house is
irrelevant to court's consideration and determination of LRA. The State presented no evidence that she had
been rejected by any program or that program was inappropriate, and Code
expresses preference for program other than hospitalization.
In re Friberg, 249
App. 3d 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill.
Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). Affirming the
trial court's order, the Appellate Court that the dispositional report and
testimony that the respondent had broken a window and needed inpatient care
constituted clear and convincing evidence that hospitalization was the least
restrictive alternative.
In re Long, 233
Ill.
App. 3d 334, 599 N.E.2d 90, 174 Ill.
Dec. 544 (2d Dist. 1992). Having heard
testimony that the respondent had lost weight, had no home, and had no job, the
trial court's order for hospitalization was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
In re Devine, 214
Ill.
App. 3d 1, 157 Ill. Dec. 774, 572
N.E.2d 238 (2d Dist. 1991). While the
Code directs the trial court to order the least restrictive alternative, it
does not require that the court make a specific finding that the ordered
treatment is the least restrictive alternative.
In re Lamb, 202
Ill.
App. 3d 725, 560 N.E.2d 422, 148 Ill.
Dec. 120 (2d Dist. 1990). Failure to file current treatment plan is reversible
error, and is neither harmless nor waived. Cursory witness testimony about
treatment plan is insufficient, as is previous treatment plan. Section 3-813
requires "current" treatment plan prepared by facility director or by
a person directed to do so by the court. "These provisions are all very
detailed given that liberty interests are involved. The State must be willing
to follow the statutory mandates..."
In re James, 191
Ill.
App. 3d 352, 547 N.E.2d 759, 138 Ill.
Dec. 592 (4th Dist. 1989). Failure of record to demonstrate preparation or
consideration of treatment plan before disposition is non-waivable error.
In re Smoots, 189
Ill.
App. 3d 289, 544 N.E.2d 1235, 136 Ill.
Dec. 460 (4th Dist. 1989). Incomplete record on dispositional report issue
resolved against appellant where testimony indicated that one existed, even
though it was not part of the record.
In re Plank, 169
Ill.
App. 3d 411, 523 N.E.2d 614, 119 Ill.
Dec. 858 (4th Dist. 1988). New and current treatment plan must be filed for
each successive petition; this error not subject to waiver.
In re Meek, 131
Ill.
App. 3d 742, 476 N.E.2d 65, 86 Ill.
Dec. 889 (4th Dist. 1985). Objections to sufficiency of dispositional report
waived if not raised in trial court before disposition determined.
In re Collins, 102
Ill.
App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill.
Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Trial court required to consider treatment plan
prior to disposition. Failure of mental health facility staff to provide 3-810
dispositional report was "but one further indication that certain staff
within the [Department] are performing their duties with either callous or blithe
disregard for the rules. Such a situation cannot be condoned."
Matter of Langdon,
53 Ill. App. 3d 768, 368 N.E.2d
1143 (3d Dist. 1977). DMHDD, not court, in best position to make determination
as to particular institution within which involuntary treatment should take
place; court not authorized to order specific DMHDD facility.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
B(5). Clear
and Convincing Evidence: In general
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that if the State adduces no valid evidentiary basis for the relief it sought, it necessarily follows that it has failed to establish its case by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Proof of mental illness alone is not a sufficient reason to confine a person against her will if she is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom; neither is a desire to improve a person’s standard of living or because society may find it uncomfortable to see such people on the street.
In re Alfred H., 358 Ill. App. 3d 784, 832 N.E.2d 964, 295 Ill.Dec. 514 (4th Dist. 2005). JUSTICE KNECHT, dissenting: Respondent might benefit from involuntary admission. Perhaps he will bathe more often and be more compliant. Perhaps his presently harmless delusions will diminish. Medication may improve his disposition and modify his behavior. However, he should not suffer a loss of liberty and be forcibly administered painful injections simply to make him a more agreeable member of our society.
In re John R. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 792 N.E.2d 350, 275 Ill. Dec. 119 (5th Dist. 2003). Evidence necessary to infringe on
liberty interests must be “real, clear, and convincing.”
In re Lawrence,
239 111. App. 3d 424, 180 Ill.
Dec. 590, 607 N.E.2d 659 (2d Dist. 1992); In re Weimer, 219
Ill. App. 3d 1005, 162 Ill.
Dec. 556, 580 N.E.2d 182 (2d Dist. 1991). Petition and allegations thereon
serve only as showing of probable cause to initiate involuntary commitment
proceedings and do not constitute evidence.
People v. Lang, 189
Ill. App. 3d 384, 545 N.E.2d 327,
136 Ill. Dec. 803 (1st Dist.
1989). Same substantive evidence is required to sustain involuntary commitment
whether initial or further commitment.
In re Williams, 151
Ill. App. 3d 911, 503 N.E.2d 816,
104 Ill. Dec. 954 (2d Dist.
1987). No error in admission of prior history of respondent where trial court
recognized that decision to involuntary admit could be based only upon present
condition.
In re Collins, 102
Ill.
App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill.
Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Certificates are not substantive evidence and cannot
provide basis for involuntary hospitalization.
In re Evans, 86
Ill.
App. 3d 263, 408 N.E.2d 33, 41 Ill.
Dec. 687 (4th Dist. 1980). Certificates serve to establish probable cause for
emergency admission, are not evidence, and cannot be used to support
involuntary admission order.
In re Stephenson,
67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273
(1977). Fundamental liberty interest v. society's interest in protection
requires clear and convincing evidence standard of proof for involuntary
admission.
Matter of Whitehouse,
56 Ill. App. 3d 245, 371 N.E.2d
990 (1st Dist. 1977). Clear and convincing evidence must be established in
certain, definite and unequivocal terms and be so convincing that it will leave
no reasonable doubt in the mind of the court; facts upon which medical opinion
is based must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, medical testimony must
be clear and convincing.
People v. Sansone,
18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d
733 (1st Dist. 1974). Medical opinion as to need for involuntary
hospitalization must be clear and convincing, and the facts upon which it is
based must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Galapeaux v. Orviller, 4 Ill. 2d 442, 123 N.E.2d 321 (1954). Medical
opinion must be stated and supporting facts established in certain, definite
and unequivocal terms and be so convincing the they will leave no doubt in the
mind of the court.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
C. Order for admission
In re Alfred H. , 358 Ill. App. 3d 784, 832 N.E.2d 964, 295 Ill.Dec. 514 (4th Dist. 2005). A trial court's order authorizing involuntary admission can only be in effect for up to six months. See 405 ILCS 5/4-611(a).
In re Tammy D. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 419, 790 N.E.2d 410, 274 Ill. Dec. 34 (5th Dist. 2003). Respondent agreed to the entry of an
order requiring her to attend outpatient treatment and then filed a motion
to vacate the order for outpatient treatment arguing that while she was willing
to participate in outpatient treatment, there was no statutory authority that
could require her to do so. She argued that the agreement was the result of
coercion, duress, mistake, and grossly disparate bargaining positions between
her and the State. While an agreement made under fraud, duress, coercion,
unfair dealing, gross disparity in the position or capacity of the parties,
or newly discovered evidence can be set aside, here respondent failed to show
that was the case but rather showed only that she changed her mind about the
agreement. As a matter of law, respondents have the right to settle her case
by agreeing to an order for outpatient treatment. Trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it found the agreement to be in good faith and denied
the motion to vacate.
In re Friberg, 249
App. 3d 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill.
Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). The trial court's order need not explicitly state
that the disposition being ordered is the least restrictive.
In re Robinson, 151
111. 2d 126, 176 Ill. Dec. 14, 601 N.E.2d 712 (1992). Section 3-810's provision that initial order
for admission shall be for period not to exceed 60 days did not require that
order state specific duration of treatment.
In re Grimes, 193
Ill.
App. 3d 119, 549 N.E.2d 616, 139 Ill.
Dec. 890 (3d Dist. 1990). No error in failure of trial court to specify on the
record factual findings and conclusions. No error in trial court's failure to
state duration of order for treatment where order directs reader to reverse
side where statement is made that initial order valid for no more than sixty
days. Where record fails to show that respondent or counsel received copy of
order, must presume counsel received copy.
In re Orr, 176
Ill.
App. 3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64, 125 Ill.
Dec. 885 (4th Dist. 1988). Involuntary hospitalization order which included
DMHDD authority to forcibly administer medications was void for want of
statutory authority.
People v. C.T.,
137 Ill. App. 3d 42, 484 N.E.2d
361 (5th Dist. 1985). Where court imposes sentence in excess of what statute
permits, legal and authorized portion of sentence is not void but excess
portion is void.
In re Gardner, 121
Ill.
App. 3d 7, 459 N.E.2d 17, 76 Ill.
Dec. 608 (4th Dist. 1984). The only methods and procedures by which one may be
admitted to a mental health facility are those specified in the MHDD Code.
In re Evans, 86
Ill.
App. 3d 263, 408 N.E.2d 33, 41 Ill.
Dec. 687 (4th Dist. 1980). Order stating that respondent is mentally ill,
unable to provide for basic needs, and is a person subject to involuntary
hospitalization is sufficient to meet requirement of 3-816(a) for court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dissent: Conclusory statements of
trial judge fail to meet 3-816(a)
requirements; conclusory
statements of expert insufficient to meet clear and convincing standard.
People v. Valdez,
79 Ill. 2d 74, 402 N.E.2d 187, 37
Ill. Dec. 297 (1980). Court had
jurisdiction to order implementation of specific court-designed treatment plan
for NGRI patient, and was not restricted to either modifying original order or
ordering discharge.
Matter of Langdon,
53 Ill. App. 3d 768, 368 N.E.2d
1143 (3d Dist. 1977). DMHDD, not court, in best position to make determination
as to particular institution within which involuntary treatment should take
place; court not authorized to order specific DMHDD facility.
Mental Health Decisions Outline
Index
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